A historic nuclear energy deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia, signed this week, presents the possibility of uranium enrichment on Saudi soil without expanded oversight, raising concerns among nuclear proliferation experts. The agreement's terms and former President Donald Trump's subsequent public statements have fueled speculation that Riyadh's enrichment capabilities could ultimately be tied to its willingness to establish a diplomatic relationship with Israel.
Trump took to social media on Thursday to assert that the energy deal, which sources say does not explicitly mention Israel, would only be approved if Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords. He also claimed there would be "no enrichment of material." However, sources told ABC News that neither the Abraham Accords nor a Saudi promise not to enrich are explicit components of the signed agreement.
U.S. officials anticipate both matters could be resolved later. The nuclear cooperation agreement includes a two-year study to explore the commercial viability of uranium enrichment versus importing nuclear fuel. The administration retains the option to decline transferring enrichment technology even while cooperating with Riyadh on building nuclear energy plants.
Richard Nephew, a former State Department and National Security Council official, noted the contingency of Saudi enrichment on recognition of a relationship with Israel adds complexity. "It just seems to me that we're adding more complexity there, and I am at least a little bit suspicious that that will be harder to pull off," he said.
Trump administration officials believe the agreement's structure could provide leverage over Riyadh. The two-year study is scheduled to conclude shortly before the end of Trump's potential term, offering a window to broker a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Simon Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute specializing in Gulf affairs, suggested the normalization issue could be integrated into the two-year discussion on the need for enrichment.
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that conversations with Saudi Arabia would continue, adding, "The president is always the final dealmaker."
Saudi Arabia has not publicly responded to Trump's assertion regarding the Abraham Accords. U.S. officials indicated they do not expect it to derail the energy pact. Progress toward normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which had been underway during the Biden administration, stalled following Hamas' attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza. Saudi Arabia has previously stated it would not normalize relations with Israel without a clear pathway to an independent Palestinian state, a condition Israel views as an existential security threat.
Proliferation Concerns
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal is the result of months of negotiations, with Saudi Arabia securing several terms previously considered non-starters by the U.S. Beyond not ruling out uranium enrichment, Saudi Arabia also reportedly rejected the "Additional Protocol," a legal agreement that grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expanded inspection and monitoring authority.
The IAEA must approve the safeguards agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to ensure compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty. In response to an ABC News inquiry, the IAEA stated it is "aware" of a "plan to ask the IAEA to implement verification measures in relation to this bilateral agreement." The Agency's Board of Governors will consider authorizing the implementation of the safeguards agreement.
Kenneth Brill, former U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, described Riyadh's resistance to inspections under the Additional Protocol as a "red flag for future concerns and problems." He stated, "The U.S. should never have agreed to enrichment without a really strong inspections regime with the IAEA." Henderson called the prospect of a covert weaponization effort by Saudi Arabia "the most glaring problem of the agreement," suggesting the kingdom's aversion to the Additional Protocol "rather suggests the Saudis have got something to hide."
Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters that any civil nuclear program agreement with Saudi Arabia would include safeguards to prevent its conversion into a weapons program. "Suffice it to say that any agreement that we're going to make with any country in the world on civil nuclear energy is going to be one that will have safeguards in place to ensure that it can't be turned into a weapons program," Rubio said.
Members of Congress have advocated for a "gold standard" for any nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, which would include a commitment from Riyadh to forgo enrichment or reprocessing of fissile materials. Sen. Jim Risch, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, previously stated that the gold standard "has to be" included in any finalized deal. In a statement on Thursday, Risch said he looks forward to reviewing the agreement's details. "I have talked to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about this on a number of occasions and both of us have been in agreement that an appropriate nuclear agreement would be in the best interest of both of our countries," he said.
Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA, commented that other countries might follow Saudi Arabia in pursuing uranium enrichment and seeking "nuclear latencies," referring to the potential for developing nuclear weapons capabilities. "The original [Nonproliferation Treaty's] nuclear disarmament takes a break," Heinonen said. "These are realities."