An Atlanta man has been indicted on a felony charge after his Google Pixel phone allegedly wiped itself clean during a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Samuel Tunick, a U.S. citizen, returned from a vacation in the Dominican Republic on January 24, 2025, when he was directed to a secondary inspection area.

According to court filings, CBP officers took possession of Tunick's phone and requested its passcode. Tunick allegedly provided a passcode that did not unlock the device. Instead, when an officer entered the code, it triggered a complete data wipe, rendering the phone's stored information inaccessible. Federal authorities later permitted Tunick to enter the country.

In November 2025, a grand jury indicted Tunick on a charge of destroying property to prevent government seizure, a rarely used federal law. His attorneys dispute the prosecution's account, arguing that agents detained him unlawfully and lacked the valid authority to seize the phone. Tunick has pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the case remains an allegation.

The incident highlights the tension between personal privacy and border security, and it may be one of the first federal prosecutions involving a phone's duress wipe feature.

GrapheneOS and the Duress Wipe Feature

Tunick's phone reportedly ran GrapheneOS, an open-source operating system designed for enhanced privacy and security on supported Google Pixel devices. GrapheneOS offers an optional feature that allows users to set a duress PIN or password, distinct from the primary unlock code. When this duress credential is entered, the GrapheneOS system initiates an immediate and irreversible wipe of all data on the device, including installed eSIMs. The GrapheneOS project states that this wipe process cannot be interrupted once initiated and does not require a reboot.

This feature is intended to protect users in coercive situations, such as encountering a violent thief. However, its use during a government search raises significant legal questions. While installing GrapheneOS or setting up the duress passcode itself is not the basis of the current charge, prosecutors are focusing on the alleged intent and timing of the wipe during the inspection.

Legal Basis for the Charge

Federal prosecutors have charged Tunick under 18 U.S.C. Section 2232(a), which prohibits knowingly destroying, damaging, or taking actions against property to prevent lawful government seizure. A conviction under this statute can carry a sentence of up to five years in federal prison and a fine. The government appears to consider the physical phone as a container for the data, which it sought to inspect and preserve.

The indictment alleges that Tunick knowingly caused the deletion of his phone's contents to prevent the government from obtaining that information. The charge does not necessitate proof that the phone contained evidence of a separate crime; the core issue is the alleged destruction of data and Tunick's intent at the time.

Defense Arguments and Border Search Authority

Tunick's defense attorneys contend that CBP officers violated his constitutional rights. They allege that agents detained him without a warrant, denied his requests for legal counsel, and failed to inform him of his rights. The defense has filed a motion to suppress statements and evidence related to the inspection, further alleging that concerns about illegal material were used as a pretext to investigate his activism against the proposed Atlanta public safety training center, often referred to as 'Cop City.'

Prosecutors dispute these claims, asserting that officers acted within their lawful border inspection authority. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on July 20, 2026, but as of the report, no ruling had been made on the motion to suppress. Tunick is presumed innocent unless the charges are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Federal officers possess broader search authority at international borders than in other parts of the country. This border-search exception allows for the inspection of travelers and their belongings entering the United States. CBP categorizes phone searches into basic and advanced types, with advanced searches requiring reasonable suspicion of a violation or a national security concern, plus senior management approval.

However, federal courts have not established a single, nationwide standard for all border phone searches, leading to legal uncertainty depending on the search method and jurisdiction.

Refusing Phone Access at the Border

U.S. citizens cannot be denied entry solely for refusing to unlock a locked electronic device. However, such refusal can lead to extended inspections or temporary detention of the phone. CBP policy states that U.S. citizens must present devices in a condition allowing inspection, but they will not be denied entry if the device remains inaccessible. Foreign visitors may face more severe consequences for non-cooperation.

Timing of Data Wipe

Removing personal data before a trip differs legally from deleting data after an inspection has begun. While travelers may choose to clear their phones at home for privacy or to carry less sensitive information, initiating a wipe once officers are actively inspecting or attempting to seize a device can be interpreted as an attempt to interfere with a search or seizure. The critical factor in Tunick's case will likely be his intent when he allegedly activated the data wipe feature.