Former members of presidential security details and investigators who worked on the task force probing the July 2024 assassination attempt on Donald Trump said Tuesday that multiple standard protective measures were not followed before the Charlie Kirk rally at Utah Valley University, where Kirk was killed and a 22-year-old Utah man, Tyler Robinson, was taken into custody.
The security veterans — who collectively represent decades of experience protecting presidents and other high-risk principals — pointed to the absence of routine advance reconnaissance, minimal screening at entry points, a small campus police presence and a failure to control nearby buildings as factors that left the event vulnerable to an attack.
Jeffrey James, who served as a senior adviser to the Trump shooting task force and spent 22 years with the Secret Service, said his typical practice when protecting a president was to visit a venue at least a week in advance and assess the speaking position from the principal’s vantage point. "From that position, I would build the security outwards," he said. "I’d look at: OK, where are our vulnerabilities on high ground? Who is in close proximity? Who are they shaking hands with on getting out the car, or taking photos with?"
James and other former agents emphasized the importance of what they called "protective intelligence" — vetting online chatter, emails and other information to identify specific threats — and said the advance work often determines whether an event is safe. "It's really all about the advanced work — that's where you keep the clients safe," said Bill Gage, who served on presidential details for George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
University officials and Kirk’s team have acknowledged some coordination. Jeff Long, the university’s police chief, said he coordinated with Kirk’s lead security officer. But the experts interviewed said that coordination typically falls short of the more exhaustive preparations required to mitigate threats from elevated positions, drones or other nontraditional attack vectors.
Chris Swecker, a former FBI agent with 24 years on the force, said campus police departments are often understaffed for large public events. "It's striking how under-manned the campus police departments are, and frankly, they're just not equipped to handle this type of event," he said. Swecker noted that colleges are often reluctant to "militarize" their campuses with visible security, creating a tension between preserving a collegiate atmosphere and providing protective measures.
Students who attended the event said there were no metal detectors, bag checks or security screenings, and that tickets were reportedly not checked. About 3,000 people were in attendance. The lack of screening and broadly open access at the venue contrasted with protocols used for higher-risk principals, the experts said.
The site layout also drew criticism. Security professionals noted that Kirk spoke from a low platform in an open area surrounded by buildings. A rooftop a reported 150 to 200 yards away provided an elevated firing position that would typically be secured or evacuated if a presidential-level protection team were in place. "While a presidential security team would enforce the evacuation of nearby buildings and place snipers on roofs, Kirk’s suspected assassin was able to lie in wait on a flat rooftop," the advisers said.
Donald Lane, a former Secret Service officer based in New Orleans, said wide-ranging threat assessments are critical before any appearance. "I call it protective intelligence — having a system whereby you vet the internet, email traffic, and do some intelligence-gathering to answer questions like: Are there any people that are out to get this particular individual? Is anybody making threats against the individual? How credible are [the threats]?" Lane said.
The advisers acknowledged limits to what private security or a university police force can provide. Kirk, 31, employed a private security firm. Several of the former officials said that while Turning Point USA, the organization founded by Kirk and described in public filings as a substantial political action committee, could afford more robust measures than were used, a presidential-style "ring of steel" is not feasible for most private political events.
Gage said a frequent operational challenge is the competing demands of event organizers who want visibility and access and security teams that seek buffer zones and restricted areas. He recounted telling then-President George W. Bush to cancel a speech in 2003 after local police could not guarantee crowd screening.
Experts said the recent shooting is likely to prompt reassessment of security at public events, particularly outdoor gatherings. "I think now we’ve seen a pattern with outdoor attacks — back to the Senate baseball game in 2017, and both attempted assassinations of Trump," James said. "I’d like to see them say: 'Hey we’re not doing outside anymore. It’s too much of a risk.'"
Officials conducting reviews include the university, local law enforcement and federal agencies involved in the investigation. The former protectors said any after-action review should examine communications among Kirk’s security team and campus police, the decision-making that led to the event layout and access controls, and the extent to which protective intelligence was used to identify credible threats.
As the investigation continues, the advisers urged that venue reconnaissance, threat vetting and tighter control of access and nearby structures be considered standard practice for high-profile appearances, even when principals rely on private security and host institutions seek to maintain an open atmosphere.