Armed forces on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine war are increasingly relying on full-scale decoys — from inflatable tanks to flat-pack mockups — to mislead surveillance, draw strikes and conserve real equipment and personnel.
The use of such deceptions has been documented across the front lines and in open-source footage. One widely circulated incident in June 2023 showed a strike on what appeared to be an armoured vehicle; subsequent footage showed a Ukrainian soldier laughing beside the burning wreck and saying that the target was a wooden decoy. Military analysts say such examples are not isolated and that large numbers of faux weapons are routinely placed to complicate enemy targeting and reconnaissance.
Decoys take many forms. Some are lightweight inflatable replicas that produce convincing silhouettes from the air. Others are rigid or plywood structures that can be assembled quickly from flat-packed components. Two-dimensional cutouts and mock-ups painted to match operational units are used near genuine formations to create visual confusion. Electronic and radar decoys work by reflecting or scattering radio waves to create false returns on adversary sensors.
The materials and construction techniques are simple and cheap compared with the real systems they imitate. Inflatable models are often made of reinforced plastics or rubber and can be deployed or moved with small teams. Flat-pack kits are designed for rapid assembly in field conditions. Radar-mimicking systems can be as low-tech as corner reflectors or as sophisticated as replicated radar cross-sections engineered to look like a tank or missile system.
Military planners and analysts say the strategic logic is straightforward: a cheap decoy that draws a single high-explosive or guided munition represents a savings of costly materiel and preserves operational tempo. Decoys force opponents to spend time and intelligence resources to verify targets, complicating decisions about munitions allocation and strike prioritization.
Both sides have adapted their use of decoys as the conflict has evolved. Early in the war, simple visual imitations were common. As surveillance has grown more sophisticated — with drones, commercial satellite imagery and electronic intelligence playing larger roles — so too have the measures to defeat those sensors. Deception techniques now routinely aim to exploit known sensor limitations, pairing visual trickery with radio-frequency signatures or deliberate positioning that mimics real unit behavior.
Observers note the tactic has historical precedents. Militaries have long used dummy tanks, aircraft and installations to divert strikes and protect valuable assets; the scale and variety of modern decoys in Ukraine, however, reflect the ubiquity of persistent aerial surveillance and the premium placed on conserving expensive, limited stocks of guided munitions.
The presence of decoys complicates verification of battlefield damage and losses. Open-source analysts and journalists must cross-check visual footage with multiple sensors and angles to confirm whether a destroyed or struck object was an operational system or a ruse. Military spokespeople and independent monitors caution that footage from a single strike or a single perspective can be misleading.
Where decoys are used effectively, they alter cost calculations for both attackers and defenders. For attackers, the risk of expending expensive guided munitions on non-operational targets increases. For defenders, decoys provide a low-cost method of area denial and survivability, allowing real systems to be concealed or repositioned while drawing the enemy's attention.
As the conflict continues, analysts say deception and counter-deception will remain part of frontline tactics. Forces on both sides are likely to refine replica designs and integrate them with camouflage, electronic signatures and movement patterns intended to pass cursory surveillance checks, while opposing forces will invest in verification methods to reduce the risk of striking fakes.