Former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland is advocating for a shift in NATO and European Union policy towards Russia, proposing what he calls the "Godfather Test." This approach suggests that Western nations should presume Russian President Vladimir Putin is responsible for suspicious incidents impacting NATO or EU countries, rather than demanding definitive proof.
Sondland draws a parallel to a scene in "The Godfather" where Don Vito Corleone implies he will hold those present accountable if his son suffers harm, regardless of the apparent cause. He argues that Russia exploits the West's democratic values, such as the presumption of innocence, to its strategic advantage by conducting operations that are difficult to definitively attribute.
"Putin forfeited the benefit of the doubt long ago," Sondland writes. "He forfeited it through the invasion of neighboring countries, the use of proxies and cutouts, cyberattacks, political interference, assassinations, sabotage, energy coercion and an endless stream of denials that collapses under scrutiny only after the damage is done."
The current Western approach, Sondland contends, involves lengthy investigations, debates over evidence, and public loss of interest, allowing Russia to proceed with further operations. This cautious approach, he suggests, makes NATO predictable and emboldens Putin, who he believes understands that Western governments are reluctant to act without publicly disclosed evidence.
Under the proposed "Godfather Test," if an incident like a drone crossing into Eastern European territory, a severed undersea cable, a crippled government network, or a disrupted railway system bears the hallmarks of Russian activity, Moscow should be held responsible unless it can prove otherwise. This reverses the traditional Western presumption of innocence.
Sondland also calls for an asymmetric response to such incidents, rather than symmetrical retaliation that allows Putin to calculate the costs. Responses should occur in areas Putin values, at a time of the West's choosing, and at a cost greater than the benefit Russia gained from its original action. This could involve actions like disabling Russian military capabilities, compromising intelligence networks, or disrupting revenue streams.
Furthermore, Sondland suggests that the West should not feel compelled to announce its responses, mirroring Russia's own secrecy. This uncertainty, he believes, would become a tool for the West, similar to how Russia has used uncertainty.
While acknowledging that intelligence and judgment remain crucial, Sondland argues that demanding courtroom-grade proof before acting on national security matters is counterproductive. He asserts that the current policy risks further escalation by Putin, who may believe the West is incapable of responding to anything short of a full-scale invasion. Deterrence, in his view, is achieved by convincing an adversary that their actions will have consequences, not by meticulously proving responsibility after the fact.
Sondland concludes that if "serious misfortune befalls one of the countries in Putin’s sights—through a drone, a cyberattack, a mysterious explosion, a damaged pipeline or some other extraordinarily convenient accident—we are going to blame the man in the room who has repeatedly threatened us, attacked his neighbors and perfected the art of deniable aggression." This would then be followed by a quiet, asymmetric response designed to ensure that future aggression incurs greater costs for Russia.