Demographers and scholars are warning that the United States could enter a phase of population decline much sooner than commonly assumed as birth rates fall and net migration falters.
In an opinion essay published this month, Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute argued that two of the long-standing engines of U.S. population growth — fertility and immigration — have weakened and that, without policy changes, the country could move into “net mortality” territory, where deaths exceed births. Eberstadt and other analysts pointed to recent statistics showing U.S. total fertility rates well below the roughly 2.1 births per woman needed for long-term population stability and to migration trends that may not offset those shortfalls.
Government projections and academic studies offer different timelines but agree on the underlying dynamics. The U.S. Census Bureau projects the crossover from natural increase to net mortality in 2038, meaning births would be exceeded by deaths beginning that year. The United Nations’ latest global projections suggest world population could peak this century and that depopulation may begin in some places as early as 2052; the U.N. also publishes lower-variant scenarios that would bring earlier declines if fertility falls further.
Measured by total fertility rate, the United States is higher than many other high-income countries but has declined sharply from postwar norms. The current U.S. fertility rate is roughly 1.6 births per woman, down from levels that historically kept the population near replacement. Between 2007 and 2023, the nation’s “natural increase” — births minus deaths — dropped from about 1.8 million to just over 500,000, according to data cited by Eberstadt.
If births continue to fall, analysts say, the timing of net mortality could move forward. Eberstadt noted that some UN low-variant scenarios, which assume further fertility declines to around 1.4 births per woman, would bring the crossover much earlier than midcentury. Those scenarios remain hypothetical and rely on assumptions about fertility, mortality and migration.
Immigration has historically been the primary counterweight to fertility declines in the United States, and migration trends will be decisive in whether the nation’s population continues to grow. Eberstadt and others emphasize that immigration’s contribution accumulates across generations: immigrants and their descendants have been central to U.S. population and labor-force growth for more than two centuries.
But recent analyses point to a falloff in net migration. A study from the American Enterprise Institute — the think tank where Eberstadt is a senior fellow — estimated that 2025 could see net emigration on the order of half a million people in a low-side scenario, meaning more people leave the country than arrive. The authors framed that estimate as an extreme bound and said it was not the most likely outcome, but they noted that such a result would make 2025 the first year of outright U.S. population decline in modern history if it came to pass. Other researchers maintain that a modest slowdown in immigration that nonetheless keeps net migration positive would delay but not prevent eventual population shrinkage if fertility remains low.
Population change is a function of births, deaths and migration, and shifts in each component are already visible in labor and public-health data. Analysts highlight declining labor-force participation among older Americans and a decrease in prime-age male participation as trends that would magnify the economic effects of fewer working-age people. Public-health researchers have flagged worsening mortality and morbidity for segments of the U.S. population, particularly some non-Hispanic white and Black subgroups, which affects the balance of deaths to births.
The fiscal implications of a shrinking and aging population are a central concern in the literature. A smaller working-age population supporting a larger cohort of retirees would raise questions about the solvency of entitlement programs, the distribution of tax burdens across generations, and the capacity of the economy to sustain growth rates seen in the latter half of the 20th century. Federal debt already exceeds gross domestic product, and many analysts say that trend would complicate responses to demographic change.
Scholars stress that depopulation is not inevitably catastrophic. Countries with shrinking and aging populations have adapted through policy choices that raise labor-force participation, boost productivity, reform health and pension systems, and, in some cases, encourage selective immigration. Eberstadt acknowledged that societies can prosper while shrinking if they successfully augment human capital and operate under business and fiscal frameworks that mobilize resources effectively.
At the same time, the distributional and political effects of demographic change are uncertain. Analysts warn that rapid shifts in the age structure could strain public finances and social cohesion if changes are sudden or poorly managed. Historical experience shows that immigration and fertility patterns can shift in response to economic conditions, public policy, and cultural trends, leaving room for policy interventions to alter projected trajectories.
Internationally, more than 50 countries and territories experienced fewer births than deaths in 2023, according to U.N. figures cited in recent commentary. Nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Russia, as well as several European Union members, already confront prolonged population decline and aging populations. Those cases are often invoked as examples of the challenges the United States might face and as potential models for policies to mitigate demographic stress.
Analysts call for clearer data and sustained attention from policymakers. Migration statistics in particular are often revised retrospectively and are described by researchers as the least precise component of population accounting. Accurate, timely measurement of births, deaths and migration would improve the ability of officials to plan for workforce, health-care and fiscal needs.
Eberstadt is scheduled to publish a book on the subject later this year. His essay adds to a growing debate among demographers, economists and policymakers about how the United States should respond if long-term population growth slows or reverses. The variety of projections, from government agencies and independent researchers, underscores how sensitive outcomes are to changes in fertility, mortality and migration — and how policy choices made in the coming years could alter demographic paths.
