Top nuclear experts led by David Albright concluded in a new analysis that Iran currently has no identifiable route to produce weapons‑grade uranium in any of its known centrifuge plants — a status the report says Iran has not held in more than 15 years. The finding follows U.S. and allied strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June that the analysis says inflicted "immense destruction" on Tehran’s enrichment infrastructure.
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), founded by Albright, said its team based the assessment on the quarterly International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports — the first since the six that became known as the 12‑Day War in June — and on other publicly available information. The report said the attacks, which it described as Operation Midnight Hammer, destroyed or rendered inoperative nearly 22,000 gas centrifuges installed at Iran’s three enrichment sites and severely degraded Iran’s ability to manufacture centrifuges, research and develop them, and produce uranium hexafluoride.
ISIS said it found "no indications that Iran moved stocks outside of these three sites" and that the military strikes eliminated Iran’s known capacity to make the nuclear weapon itself. The team also noted that the United States deployed stealth bombers and used 14 Guided Bomb Unit Massive Ordnance Penetrators in the June attacks, which were aimed at facilities including the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant.
At the same time, the analysis cautioned that it is difficult to produce a definitive "breakout" estimate — the time required for a state to acquire enough weapons‑grade material for a single nuclear device — because of uncertainties about the number and operability of any centrifuges not observed to be destroyed and the availability of enriched uranium stocks. The report said, "Calculating a breakout time would require unsubstantiated speculation about the existence and operability of centrifuges that were not destroyed in the war, such as centrifuges already made but not yet deployed, as well as about the availability of enriched uranium stocks."
ISIS noted that Iran curtailed cooperation with the IAEA shortly after the strikes, limiting the agency’s information about nuclear material and sites. "The IAEA has little to no information about Iran’s nuclear material stockpiles or nuclear sites since the 12‑day war broke out," the analysis said, explaining why researchers supplemented IAEA reporting with other public sources. Albright is a former IAEA inspector.
U.S. officials and supporters pointed to the analysis as confirmation of administration assertions after the June attacks. President Donald Trump publicly described Operation Midnight Hammer soon after it was carried out as having "rendered Iran’s nuclear program completely and totally obliterated," and a White House spokeswoman, Anna Kelly, said in response to the ISIS conclusions, "Your friendly reminder that Iran’s nuclear capabilities are OBLITERATED!" The analysis itself stressed the limits of certainty in the absence of full on‑site verification.
Iranian authorities responded to the strikes by ordering a halt to cooperation with the IAEA, and Tehran has said it will pursue its nuclear and defensive programs in the aftermath. International monitors and nonproliferation experts caution that long‑term assessments depend on restored access for inspectors and on verification of whether any materials or equipment were dispersed or hidden prior to the attacks.
The ISIS report represents a significant, if qualified, assessment of current Iranian enrichment capability: it calls into question Tehran’s immediate ability to produce weapons‑grade uranium at known sites while underscoring that definitive conclusions about breakout timelines require better information. The IAEA’s next public reporting and any resumption of inspections will be central to tracking Iran’s nuclear trajectory and to international efforts to verify compliance with nonproliferation norms.
