The United Kingdom has formally proscribed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designating the Iranian military and political organization as a terrorist group. This decision aligns the UK with actions taken by the United States in 2019 and the European Union in January of the current year.
Keir Starmer, leader of the Labour Party, has been credited with summoning the political will for this proscription, which has been described as long overdue. The IRGC, established in the years following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, evolved from a counterweight to the traditional armed forces into an elite fighting force. It commands an estimated 190,000 personnel and operates its own navy, ballistic missile program, and the Quds Force, which coordinates ties with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and is accused of fomenting unrest in Western capitals.
However, the UK government's approach has drawn scrutiny. Instead of proscribing the IRGC under the Terrorism Act, it enacted the National Security (State Threats) Act. This legislation focuses on offenses directly commanded, financed, or materially supported by the IRGC. Critics argue this approach creates gaps, as the Terrorism Act includes provisions prohibiting the display of flags, uniforms, and official materials of a proscribed organization, which were reportedly rejected in amendments to the new act.
Kasra Araabi, director of IRGC Research at United Against Nuclear Iran, noted that the IRGC is adept at political warfare. The organization's threat is perceived to extend beyond military actions to include the funding of charities, schools, and religious centers in Western countries to build influence and shape public opinion. Reports have detailed such networks in London, referred to as 'Little Tehran,' where extremist speakers allegedly promote Islamism and children are taught to praise Iran's Supreme Leaders.
British intelligence has reported foiling numerous Iranian-backed plots on UK soil. Since 2022, MI5 has disrupted at least 20 such plots involving murder, kidnap, or serious violence. The UK has also seen attacks on its expatriate community, including the stabbing of journalist Pouria Zeraati, which British intelligence attributed to the Iranian state.
Beyond targeting individuals, the IRGC allegedly operates a vast business empire to fund its operations. This includes the sale of crude oil through shell companies and a 'shadow fleet' of tankers, often disguised and blended with other states' oil before being sold via intermediaries in the Middle East or Asia. Funds are reportedly channeled through offshore accounts and front companies to IRGC accounts.
Calls have been made to extend sanctions to all entities involved in this network, including tanker owners, banks, and buyers facilitating the trade. Refineries caught purchasing disguised Iranian crude could face market access restrictions, and front companies such as construction firms, charities, and shipping firms could also be targeted. Additionally, the IRGC is accused of illegally procuring Western spare parts and technology through brokers in third countries, which are then smuggled or falsely declared as civilian goods.
The author argues that proscription alone is insufficient and advocates for a comprehensive plan to cripple the IRGC, including targeting its financial infrastructure and supply chains for critical components. The proscription of the IRGC, it is argued, should be a precursor to proscribing the regime itself to counter the export of its ideology and violence.