Britain's mobile network infrastructure is in a state of crisis, struggling to meet basic connectivity demands and falling behind nations like Kazakhstan, according to former Conservative security minister Tom Tugendhat. The issue, he argues, stems from a "paralysing" planning system that hinders the deployment of essential infrastructure.
Tugendhat recounted a personal experience of losing mobile signal and internet access shortly after departing Paris on the Eurostar, a problem that persisted from the Channel coast to London. He noted similar issues in affluent areas of London, stating his experience in the capital has been worse than in Kabul during his time with the British Army over a decade ago. These anecdotes have been echoed by numerous individuals on social media, leading to the formation of a campaign group called Buffering Britain.
Data supports these claims. A 2024 report by network testing specialist MedUX ranked London last among 15 major European cities for overall 5G mobile service, describing its speed, reliability, and availability as "sub-par." Network coverage mapper Streetwave indicates that only 55 percent of the UK's landmass has acceptable mobile coverage, and the UK ranks 59th globally for mobile download speeds, significantly behind countries like South Korea.
The core of the problem, Tugendhat asserts, lies in the UK's planning system. While the general planning approval rate in England stands at 86 percent, it drops to just 51 percent for telecom masts. Some local authorities reject applications at rates exceeding 80 percent, and even approved projects can take up to 500 days. The author suggests that local politicians often oppose new masts, influenced by vocal neighbors rather than the broader community benefits.
Furthermore, the way coverage is measured can be misleading, with areas counting as "covered" even if mobile data speeds are extremely slow. Land developers can also easily dismantle masts, which only need to be replaced within three years. High taxes and state control further burden mast companies and mobile networks, discouraging investment in new infrastructure.
Tugendhat contrasts the UK's situation with France, where regulators mandate networks to maintain coverage along high-speed train lines, even after the removal of Chinese Huawei equipment, a move also made by the UK but without similar improvements in network quality.
To address the crisis, Tugendhat proposes several solutions. First, he advocates for automatic planning permission for new mobile masts, requiring explicit and distinct grounds for objection. Second, he calls for shared access, suggesting that when Network Rail undertakes planned track closures, network operators should have guaranteed rights to upgrade equipment, capitalizing on existing disruption for connectivity improvements. While acknowledging the government's Project Reach initiative, he points out its limited scope, excluding crucial routes like the South Eastern Main Line.
Finally, Tugendhat stresses the need for a dedicated government minister to oversee the rollout, framing the issue not as a technological challenge but a matter of political will. He argues that mobile signal is as fundamental as water and power, essential for national modernization. The potential economic benefits of a full 5G rollout are substantial, with BT estimating an addition of £230 billion to the economy by 2035. The ability to connect, he concludes, was once the source of Britain's global leadership and its failure to maintain it is now a significant cost.