Former President Donald Trump is seeking to re-engage in summit diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, facing a Pyongyang armed with a more substantial nuclear arsenal and a strengthened relationship with Russia. Analysts suggest that unlike during Trump's previous term, North Korea has less incentive to strike a comprehensive denuclearization deal.
Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, posited that Trump might view renewed diplomacy with North Korea as a means to divert attention from the ongoing nuclear standoff with Iran and to diminish the number of adversaries confronting the United States. "There really isn't a military solution for a country like North Korea that has 50, 60, 70 nuclear weapons and several delivery systems for those weapons," Cha stated.
This assessment suggests that a broad denuclearization agreement is increasingly improbable. Instead, negotiations might focus on more limited objectives such as restricting nuclear and long-range missile tests, establishing crisis communication channels, curbing Pyongyang's ties with Moscow, or potentially reaching a peace agreement that allows Kim's nuclear arsenal to remain intact. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, commented, "North Korea can drive a harder bargain now than it could have in 2018."
Trump has indicated expectations of meeting Kim before the year's end, citing his personal relationship with the North Korean leader as a positive factor for restarting diplomacy. "I get along with him. And you know what? The fact that I get along with him, that's a good thing, not a bad thing," Trump said.
A White House official, speaking on background, confirmed that a meeting would occur "at the appropriate time" but offered no specifics on timing, location, or preparatory details.
Potential outcomes for Trump could include a limited agreement aimed at reducing immediate nuclear risks rather than eliminating North Korea's weapons program. Cha identified specific goals such as formally banning nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, reducing Pyongyang's ties with Moscow, and establishing a crisis-management channel. Cha also suggested Trump might pursue a peace declaration or treaty to claim progress on the Korean conflict, which has technically remained unresolved since the 1953 armistice.
Washington's potential bargaining tools include phased sanctions relief, adjustments to military exercises or U.S. force posture, a possible peace agreement, and the diplomatic value of direct engagement. For Kim, a deal that preserves his nuclear weapons could be framed as progress toward his regime's objective of gaining de facto recognition as a nuclear weapons state.
Cha suggested that North Korea might also engage with Trump to mitigate the risk of military confrontation, referencing Trump's past willingness to use military force. Trump's reduction in joint military exercises with South Korea, a step he also took during his first diplomatic engagement with Kim, could be seen as an initial negotiating move, though North Korea dismissed it as insufficient at the time.
Anthony Ruggiero, who previously served on the National Security Council for North Korea during the Trump administration, noted that the reduction in exercises aligns with a pattern from Trump's earlier diplomacy with Kim. "I'm kind of surprised that people are surprised. President Trump took the same action in his first term, and the only thing that's really surprising is not that he did it; it's that he waited this long to do it," Ruggiero said.
At their 2018 summit in Singapore, Kim committed to working towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, though the agreement lacked a timetable or verification mechanisms, and Pyongyang now reportedly rejects denuclearization as a negotiation basis. Cha highlighted that eight years ago, Kim faced greater pressure from UN Security Council sanctions and a worsening food situation, giving Trump more leverage then than now.
The shift in leverage is partly attributed to North Korea's deepening relationship with Russia. Pyongyang's provision of weapons and troop support for Russia's war in Ukraine has strengthened its ties with Moscow, a partner capable of offering economic and military support while providing a shield against further UN Security Council accountability. China also remains a crucial economic partner for North Korea.
Despite these shifts, sanctions relief could still serve as a significant incentive. Ruggiero stated that the effectiveness of pressure diminishes if the U.S. does not actively counter North Korea's methods of evading sanctions.
The recovery of American war dead from the Korean War could also yield a tangible humanitarian outcome. The Singapore agreement included a commitment to recover the remains of U.S. service members, and Pyongyang returned 55 boxes of remains in 2018. Future agreements could aim to restart joint recovery operations within North Korea.
Davenport reiterated that a comprehensive disarmament deal remains unlikely, advising Trump to concentrate on measures that reduce nuclear risk and slow program growth, such as a missile-test moratorium, crisis communication, and a potential freeze on nuclear development. She added that while a return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors would be ideal, it is not expected early in the process. Davenport suggested that satellite imagery could still aid in monitoring reactor operations, plutonium reprocessing, and missile testing, although verifying a halt in uranium enrichment would be more challenging.
A direct crisis-management channel could hold significant value, as Washington currently lacks an established military communication line with Pyongyang. "If all of a sudden our radars pick up a ballistic missile flying through the air, we have no way of contacting North Korea to ask them, ‘Is this your intent? Did you send this?’" Cha explained.
Cha also noted a degree of restraint in North Korea's recent activity, pointing out that while the country conducted several ICBM tests during the Biden administration, it has not tested an ICBM in flight since Trump returned to office. North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test since 2017.
Any potential agreement would also necessitate careful consideration of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. While Seoul might welcome renewed dialogue, it would likely be cautious about concessions impacting U.S. troop levels or military exercises. Cha suggested that South Korea may not have been privy to Trump's decision to reduce military exercises beforehand but could view renewed U.S.-North Korea negotiations as a positive step if diplomacy restarts. However, South Korea would expect a role in future negotiations and assurances that its alliance interests are not compromised.
"Where the rubber really hits the road on this is the whole question of U.S. troops in Korea because North Korea would like them out, South Korea would like them to stay, and it's not entirely clear what President Trump wants," Cha said.