Survivors Demand Safety System After Official Report Shows Driver Accelerated Through Red Signal

Survivors of a train crash near Bedford are calling for the installation of a safety system that they believe could have prevented the disaster, following an interim report by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). The report indicates that the driver, Shaun Burton, 60, accelerated past a red signal before his train collided with another.

The crash occurred on June 19 when Burton's East Midlands Railway (EMR) Class 360 Luton Express struck the back of a Class 810 high-speed train south of Bedford station. The collision resulted in 160 injuries, with 11 people sustaining very serious harm, and claimed the life of the driver.

According to the RAIB's findings, Burton was alerted to the red signal by his train's Automatic Warning System (AWS) but silenced the alarm and continued to accelerate. He was traveling at 58 mph as he entered the line occupied by the train in front, which had stopped unexpectedly due to a safety system malfunction. Burton applied the brakes approximately 10 seconds before impact, about 850 feet from the other train.

Solicitors representing passengers from both trains have stated that the crash might have been avoided if the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) had been in place. TPWS is designed to automatically bring a train to a safe stop and was implemented following fatal accidents such as the 1997 Southall and 1999 Paddington disasters. The system requires additional trackside equipment, with estimates suggesting a 'cost per life saved' of £8.8 million.

Network Rail currently installs TPWS primarily in 'high-risk' areas, such as near converging railway lines. However, an inquiry had previously recommended its widespread adoption on high-speed lines like the one near Bedford. Despite this, Network Rail had reviewed the signal at Bedford last year and determined that TPWS was not necessary for the route, which they classified as low risk. Records indicated no previous instances of signals passed at danger (SPAD) at this signal since 1985, and regulations allowed exemptions for signals where rear-end collisions were a possibility.

Des Collins, a lawyer for some of the crash victims, expressed concern that the lack of TPWS on that stretch of railway exacerbated the SPAD incident. "This system is specifically designed to automatically bring a train to a safe stop, which would have prevented this accident," Collins stated. He added that it is troubling that Network Rail assessed the area as low risk, implying that lessons from past inquiries have not been fully implemented.

Network Rail stated it cannot comment on calls for TPWS due to the ongoing RAIB investigation. Mark Budden, East Midlands route director for Network Rail, affirmed that the organization is carefully reviewing the interim findings and cooperating with the RAIB and industry partners. "Keeping passengers and colleagues safe is our top priority," Budden said, vowing to learn from the incident to shape future decision-making.

The RAIB is still working to determine why Burton silenced the AWS alarm and continued to accelerate. In-cabin CCTV footage showed him acknowledging the AWS alarm, but the crucial seconds before the collision were lost due to crash-induced corruption of the digital recording.

Questions also remain regarding why the front train's emergency brakes were activated due to a fault in its AWS equipment, although Network Rail has reported no faults with the trackside AWS systems.

East Midlands Railway stated it could not comment on the interim report but affirmed its commitment to supporting those affected and cooperating with authorities. A Department for Transport spokesperson reiterated that safety is paramount across the rail network and that the department will ensure the industry acts on the findings of the full RAIB report once it is published, which is not expected until well into next year.