The Supreme Court has significantly expanded presidential authority in a ruling that allows presidents to remove leaders of independent federal agencies at will. The decision in Trump v. Slaughter effectively overturns more than a century of precedent that protected certain agency officials from arbitrary dismissal, a move that consolidates power within the executive branch.
At the heart of the case was the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an agency established in 1914 with leaders protected from removal except for specific causes such as neglect or malfeasance. Historically, Congress has created numerous such independent agencies, allowing them to operate with a degree of insulation from direct presidential control. The Supreme Court's decision, however, aligns with the long-held “unitary executive” theory, which posits that all executive power belongs to the president and must be fully controlled by the president.
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts stated that agency leaders wielding power within the "heartland of executive power" must be fireable at will by the president. This decision marks the culmination of a decades-long effort by conservative judges to dismantle independent agencies. The court's Republican majority had signaled this direction in previous decisions, including a 2009 case that questioned the precedent set in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935), the case that first upheld the independence of such agencies.
The ruling was issued alongside Trump v. Cook, a case involving a member of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors. In Cook, the Court suggested that Federal Reserve members may retain independence, characterizing the Federal Reserve as a "uniquely structured, quasi-private entity." However, the opinion in Cook was described as "narrow," primarily holding that the president must provide some minimal process before removal. The exact implications for the Federal Reserve's independence remain to be fully determined.
The unitary executive theory, championed by figures like the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argues that the Constitution vests all executive power in the president. Critics contend that the court's recent rulings, including the one on presidential immunity, have made bold claims about executive power not supported by historical interpretation. For instance, the argument that the power to prosecute crimes belongs entirely to the executive, even if wielded unlawfully, has been challenged as anachronistic, given historical instances of judges appointing prosecutors.
Similarly, the justification for deeming the FTC an "executive" agency, based on its enforcement of statutes and pursuit of legal action against companies, is questioned by those who note that many federal statutes are enforced by private attorneys not subordinate to the president. The core of the unitary executive theory, according to critics, seizes on a vague constitutional clause to grant specific, broad powers to the president.
While the Slaughter decision broadly diminishes the independence of federal agencies, the separate, narrower ruling in Cook offers a potential, albeit limited, reprieve for the Federal Reserve, acknowledging policy reasons for its insulation from direct presidential control. The extent to which this distinction will hold in future cases is yet to be seen.