Supreme Court Considers Whether Constitution Blocks Climate Lawsuits
Oil giants argue that state courts are barred from hearing climate change-related lawsuits based on the "structure of the Constitution," a claim critics say lacks textual support.
The Supreme Court is set to hear arguments in a pivotal case, Suncor Energy v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, which could determine whether state courts can hear lawsuits seeking to hold oil companies accountable for the costs of climate change. The case pits Boulder, Colorado, officials against energy companies Suncor and Exxon Mobil, who are asking the Court to rule that such cases are barred from state courts, not by a specific law, but by the inherent "structure of the Constitution."
This argument diverges from established legal precedent, which generally permits state courts to hear environmental lawsuits, even those involving pollution that crosses state or international lines. For instance, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals (1971), the Supreme Court allowed Ohio to sue chemical companies in Michigan and Canada for dumping mercury into waterways that flowed into Lake Erie.
The oil companies' primary argument rests on the idea that climate change litigation is inherently a federal matter, preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. However, the Clean Air Act itself states that air pollution control is a "primary responsibility of States and local governments." Furthermore, the law generally permits states to enact and enforce their own air pollution standards, unless they are less stringent than federal requirements. This suggests the Clean Air Act does not preclude state nuisance suits like the one brought by Boulder.
More controversially, the companies invoke the "structure of the Constitution" to argue against state court jurisdiction. They contend that the Court has historically held interstate pollution to be an exclusively federal domain, citing cases like Missouri v. Illinois (1906). In that case, the Court considered a dispute over sewage dumping, suggesting federal courts might have a role in environmental suits even without explicit congressional authorization. The oil companies argue this established a "federal common law" that preempted state environmental lawsuits, a preemption that they claim persists even after federal laws like the Clean Air Act superseded this common law.
Critics, including former Judge Neil Gorsuch who, in 2016, cautioned against arguments not supported by the Constitution's text, argue this "structure of the Constitution" argument is unfounded. They point to more recent rulings, such as Hencely v. Fluor Corp. (2026), which emphasized that preemption claims must be grounded in specific constitutional text or federal statutes. The oil companies' failure to cite direct constitutional text for their argument is seen by opponents as a significant weakness.
Despite the weak legal footing of their constitutional argument, the oil companies may be banking on the current Supreme Court's tendency to interpret constitutional principles narrowly, particularly when achieving politically favored outcomes. This approach has been observed in previous rulings where textual adherence appeared secondary to desired results.
While their legal arguments are contested, the oil companies do present a policy argument for consolidating climate change litigation in federal courts. They highlight the complexity of assigning responsibility for climate change among numerous domestic and international actors, and the challenges of adjudicating claims that involve transboundary pollution and foreign entities. Such broad issues, they suggest, are better handled in a unified federal proceeding rather than through numerous state-level lawsuits.
However, this argument, critics contend, should be directed at Congress, the body responsible for legislating on such matters. Congress could enact laws to preempt state lawsuits and establish a federal compensation framework if it deemed it necessary. The oil companies' choice to seek this outcome from the Supreme Court, bypassing the legislative process, has drawn criticism.
The Suncor case, therefore, stands as a significant test of the Supreme Court's commitment to textualism and originalism, and will have far-reaching implications not only for climate change litigation but potentially for the broader landscape of legal challenges to state and federal laws. It also raises questions about whether the Court will allow arguments based on perceived constitutional structures to override established legal pathways and statutory provisions.