SAS Commander Warned of 'Stab in the Back' Over Human Rights Act in Afghanistan

A senior commander within the Special Air Service (SAS) warned in 2005 that the regiment risked being "stabbed in the back by those in London" due to the Ministry of Defence's embrace of "lawfare" and the Human Rights Act. This assertion came as the SAS prepared to deploy to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, a mission that would later prove costly.

Richard Williams, then the commanding officer of the SAS, voiced strong reservations about the operational parameters set for the deployment. Unlike in Iraq, where a Status of Forces Agreement allowed for the detention of suspects and offensive actions based on hostile intent, Afghanistan presented a different challenge. Afghan President Hamid Karzai opposed detention and night raids, and the UK's Rules of Engagement restricted soldiers to using lethal force only when their lives were in immediate danger. Williams feared these restrictions would render his soldiers' mission "virtually impossible."

Williams predicted that the approach to Afghanistan would likely foster an insurgency rather than prevent one, and that restrictive legal constraints could lead to significant British casualties. His estimate of up to 500 British soldiers losing their lives in Helmand was remarkably close to the final combat toll of 407 when operations ceased in 2014. He refused to commit an SAS squadron to what he considered a flawed strategy, prioritizing the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq instead.

Despite pressure to change his mind, Williams maintained his stance. His tenure concluded in 2008, and he resigned his commission. In his parting remarks, he cautioned that the Ministry of Defence's acceptance of "lawfare" and the Human Rights Act could lead to the SAS being undermined by officials in London who did not grasp the "essential and often brutal nature of the counter-terrorist fight."

A more compliant commander replaced Williams, and an SAS squadron was deployed to Helmand. However, the operational realities differed significantly from Iraq. The "revolving door" of captured insurgents being released within days due to restrictions on transferring them to Afghan jurisdiction, where their safety could not be guaranteed, became a major issue. This policy, dictated by the Human Rights Act, meant that "the lives of British soldiers were being sacrificed to preserve the human rights of those determined to blast them into the afterlife."

The Rules of Engagement, which mandated that soldiers could only fire when believing their lives were in immediate danger, were particularly problematic for bombmakers. These individuals often avoided carrying weapons, thus not posing an "immediate threat" under the specified criteria, allowing them to continue their activities. Sir Mark Sedwill, the UK ambassador to Afghanistan, reportedly sided with the SAS, relaying concerns to Foreign Office officials that too much was expected of soldiers operating under such constraints. He was reportedly told to focus on his ambassadorial duties rather than military matters.

Operation Tyburn in early 2011 exemplified the SAS's predicament. The mission targeted a bombmaker named Sadam Hussein. The SAS faced a choice: detain Hussein and his associates, knowing they would likely return to the battlefield, or eliminate them to protect British soldiers and civilians. During the raid, Hussein and two others were killed after reportedly producing grenades or rifles. The SAS reported recovering weapons, but relatives of the deceased claimed they were unarmed civilians.

Special Forces lawyers expressed concerns about the way such incidents were being documented, fearing they would not withstand scrutiny in future inquiries. Alistair McAndrew, Senior Legal Adviser, noted the emerging Taliban tactic of hiding grenades behind curtains, which then served as the SAS's justification for opening fire. He worried about how to ensure soldiers acted legally under threat without hindering their effectiveness.

SAS sources vehemently denied accusations of a casual disregard for life, asserting that operations were authorized by Ministry of Defence lawyers and that the presence of SAS soldiers was intended to protect civilians. The argument was made that these soldiers were placed in an impossible situation by ineffective Rules of Engagement and legal restrictions imposed from afar.

In another instance during the winter of 2010-2011, SAS Trooper Wayne Hopkins was involved in a raid targeting insurgents preparing suicide-improvised explosive devices. Hopkins and his unit killed three individuals, later logged as Enemies Killed in Action (EKIA). Hopkins later expressed anxiety about the legality of his actions, particularly after being instructed to take a detainee "back inside and do a search," which he understood as a directive to eliminate the suspect. His commanding officer, Cal Rossi, later assured him that such actions were taken only when necessary to prevent the release of dangerous individuals.