Ukraine's intensifying drone strikes deep into Russia and its pressure on Russian-annexed Crimea, actions once feared to provoke nuclear retaliation from Moscow, have seemingly diminished the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear threats. The calculus for escalating to nuclear weapons use appears increasingly complex for Moscow, with questions arising about the actual utility and risks of such a move.
At a recent NATO summit in Turkey, leaders endorsed Ukraine's campaign of strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure, aiming to impose costs on Russian citizens and pressure the government to halt the invasion. One recent night saw Ukraine launch over 400 drones into Russia.
This shift comes after a period where similar strikes within Russia's borders would have elicited stark warnings from the Kremlin about crossing "red lines" and concerns from the United States about nuclear escalation. These fears had previously influenced U.S. decisions, including resistance to a no-fly zone over Ukraine in 2022 and reluctance to provide advanced weaponry like HIMARS, ATACMS missiles, and F-16 fighter jets, or restricting their use to Ukrainian territory.
However, the frequency of Russia's past nuclear threats has, according to one Western official speaking to the Financial Times, "devalued the currency." Russian nuclear saber-rattling has become less pronounced, even as attacks inside Russia, including on cities like Moscow, have accelerated. Russia's self-declared "red lines" are now being crossed with regularity.
Since last year, the U.S. has not only refrained from hindering these strikes but has also provided intelligence to support them. In Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, strikes on key infrastructure have led to shortages. On the battlefield, Russian forces lost approximately 400 square miles of territory in April and May.
Despite continued Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, the fear of nuclear escalation appears to have notably decreased. Maria Snegovaya, a political analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted at a recent panel discussion that despite Ukraine striking over 2,500 kilometers deep into Russia, "we don’t see that escalation."
Several factors may explain Russia's reluctance to use nuclear weapons. The risk of radioactive fallout reaching Russian territory, an outcome Russia is acutely aware of from the Chernobyl disaster, is a significant deterrent. James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment, points to a strategy of "salami slicing" by Ukraine and its allies, where incremental escalatory steps have not individually warranted a catastrophic response.
He suggested that providing Ukraine with all its current capabilities on day one of the conflict would have been highly escalatory. The phased delivery of weapons, while frustrating for Ukraine, may have helped avert a more destructive conflict.
Furthermore, the practical utility of using nuclear weapons, particularly tactical ones, on Ukraine's long, sparsely manned frontlines is questionable. Such a strike could irradiate territory Russia aims to control.
Reports from 2023 indicated that Russian officials believed even a limited nuclear strike would not benefit Russia. While a strategic nuclear strike to force concessions remains a theoretical possibility, it carries immense risks. In the fall of 2022, amid Ukrainian advances toward Crimea, U.S. intelligence assessed a 50 percent chance of Russian nuclear use. However, warnings from the U.S., UK, and France of a conventional military response, and China's caution to Putin, likely influenced Moscow's decision-making.
Despite these developments, some experts express continued concern. George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute, warns against Western complacency regarding escalation risks. He highlighted Ukraine's attacks on Russia's strategic bomber fleet and early warning radars as potential triggers for retaliation. The significance of Crimea to Putin's legitimacy could also lead to desperate measures.
Moreover, some Russian foreign policy analysts, like Sergey Karaganov, have publicly advocated for nuclear use. Karaganov suggested nuclear tests followed by conventional strikes in Europe, arguing that a nuclear war could be "easily won."
For now, Putin appears to believe a war of attrition will prevail. However, if the battlefield situation deteriorates significantly or his regime faces existential threats, the calculus could change.
Notably, Beebe expressed greater concern about potential conventional attacks on NATO territory, particularly in the Baltic states and Poland, than about immediate nuclear weapon use by Russia.
The war in Ukraine is testing the perceived utility of nuclear weapons. Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russia's nuclear forces, stated, "We’ve found out, by an absolutely terrible experiment, that nuclear weapons are pretty much unusable."
While nuclear threats have deterred direct NATO involvement and Russian attacks on NATO countries, their effectiveness as a deterrent against conventional attacks, or as a tool to compel non-nuclear states, is being questioned. The war demonstrates that conventional means alone can inflict massive casualties, raising concerns that a world less fearful of nuclear escalation might see more protracted, high-casualty conventional conflicts.