A fatal train crash on the Midland Main Line south of Bedford on June 19, which killed driver Shaun Burton, 60, and injured passengers, has brought scrutiny to the absence of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS). This safety measure is designed to halt trains automatically if they pass a red signal.
Investigators from the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) found that Burton's train did not stop at a red signal after the train ahead was halted due to a fault with its Automatic Warning System (AWS). Black box data indicated Burton's train applied its brakes nine seconds before impact, decelerating from 76 mph to 49 mph, but it failed to stop at the red signal.
TPWS, which uses trackside electromagnets to enforce stops at red signals, is installed on much of the UK's rail network. However, Network Rail reportedly assessed the route south of Bedford as having a low risk of a crash in the event of a signal passed at danger (SPAD). The system is typically deployed as a last resort on higher-risk lines, such as those with converging tracks or buffer stops.
Dave Calfe, general secretary of the drivers' union ASLEF, stated that the accident could have been prevented had TPWS been installed, asserting, "If TPWS had been installed, this accident would not have happened, the driver would not have died and no passengers would have been injured."
TPWS was rolled out nationwide between 2000 and 2003 following a series of fatal incidents where SPADs played a role, including the 1997 Southall disaster and the 1999 Paddington crash. The system has been credited with a significant reduction in 'potentially severe' SPAD events and fatalities since its implementation. The initial rollout cost £575 million, with an estimated saving of 65 lives over 25 years.
Despite trains on the Midland line reaching speeds of up to 125 mph, Network Rail's risk assessment identified the line south of Bedford as a 'plain line' without specific complications, leading to the decision not to install TPWS. Rail engineer Gareth Dennis commented that passengers might reasonably expect such protection across the entire network.
Investigators are also examining the performance of the AWS on both trains. AWS, developed after the 1952 Harrow and Wealdstone disaster, alerts drivers to upcoming signals via an audible horn, requiring acknowledgement. However, if acknowledged, drivers can still pass a red signal if TPWS is not present. The investigation is looking into why the front train's AWS activated unexpectedly and assessing the AWS on Burton's train, as well as checking the functionality of trackside magnets.
Network Rail expressed deep sorrow and committed to supporting the ongoing investigation, stating that incidents like this are rare on Britain's railways. The company has vowed to act quickly on any lessons learned once the investigation concludes. Passenger services on the Midland Main Line were set to resume following the recovery of the damaged trains.