A civilian plane crash in New Mexico last May, which resulted in the deaths of four people, has brought renewed attention to the U.S. military's testing culture and its potential impact on civilian safety. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a report indicating that a nearby military exercise may have interfered with the aircraft's GPS signals, essential for navigation.
While the NTSB has not definitively confirmed that the military testing directly caused the fatal crash, the incident highlights a broader concern about secretive military programs and their proximity to civilian infrastructure. This is not an isolated event. In February, the civilian airport in El Paso, Texas, experienced a significant closure due to the testing of high-energy anti-drone systems by the military. Defense officials have faced questions regarding the decision to conduct such exercises near an international airport, despite the availability of large, restricted testing grounds.
These incidents point to what some describe as a systemic crisis in the U.S. Armed Forces' testing and acquisition systems, a problem alleged to have persisted for decades. Retired Army Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities, has voiced concerns based on personal experience, including his involvement in the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in the mid-2000s.
FCS, pitched as a revolutionary technological initiative to replace older tanks and fighting vehicles, promised a network of advanced ground combat vehicles and drones. However, according to Davis, the underlying technology was insufficient to meet the ambitious goals. Instead of acknowledging limitations, he alleges that Army leadership manipulated test parameters and misrepresented results to portray success. The program was ultimately canceled in 2009 by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, after nearly $20 billion had been invested.
The issues reportedly continued with subsequent programs. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, an attempt to salvage technology from FCS, was canceled in 2014 after consuming another $1.5 billion. The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program, launched in 2018, also collapsed under difficult requirements and tight deadlines, being canceled in 2020. The current iteration, the XM30 Combat Vehicle program, aims for a fieldable fleet around 2030.
These procurement challenges are not confined to the Army. The Air Force's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has been criticized for prioritizing mass production over critical development testing, leading to persistent software issues and maintenance problems before full combat testing was completed. The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship program faced structural flaws and budget overruns, resulting in fewer ships being built than planned, with few remaining combat-capable. The Zumwalt-class destroyer program, intended to yield 32 stealth warships, was drastically cut to only three vessels due to exorbitant costs and unfulfilled technological promises, with none currently fully combat-capable.
Critics argue that when military leadership prioritizes public relations over rigorous testing, the outcomes include not only massive cost overruns but also the deployment of weapons systems that fail to perform as needed. This approach, they contend, weakens the Joint Force, wastes taxpayer money, and compromises tactical readiness, as recent events in civilian airspace suggest, potentially endangering civilian lives.