Oct. 7 Attack's Lingering Impact on Israeli Society and Politics

The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, catalyzed devastating conflict across the region, but within Israel, political sentiments have shifted less dramatically than might be expected. While the assault confirmed long-held warnings for some on the right that withdrawal from Gaza would lead to disaster, and for the left that prolonged military rule over Palestinians inevitably breeds violence, the fundamental divisions in Israeli society predate the attack.

The World After Oct. 7

The war in Gaza that began on Oct. 7 has become Israel's longest. Ceasefire agreements with Lebanon, stable since 2006, became precarious when Hezbollah fired on Israel the day after the Hamas attack, leading to ongoing escalations. Israel and the U.S. have also engaged in direct conflicts with Iran, increasing regional instability. The collective losses from Oct. 7 and subsequent fighting have profoundly affected Israel. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis have been in and out of reserve duty, and many have participated in ongoing demonstrations demanding a deal for the release of hostages.

Since 2023, Israel has experienced record emigration and growing international isolation. A significant majority of Israelis, 61%, reported a poor national mood in a poll by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI). The destruction of Palestinian life and society in Gaza continues, raising questions about Israel's future reckoning.

Attitudes Toward a Two-State Solution

Despite the widespread turmoil, attitudes toward Palestinians, occupation, and conflict have become more extreme, yet this trend largely reflects pre-Oct. 7 sentiments. Support for a two-state solution reached historic lows even before the attack. In a December 2022 survey, only 39% of Israelis supported a two-state solution, with just 34% of Jewish respondents in favor. By mid-2024, twice as many Jewish respondents favored an Israeli-dominated unequal state over a two-state solution.

Palestinian attitudes mirrored this trend, with only one-third supporting two states in 2022. Surveys from the IDI around the same time indicated that 59% of Jewish Israelis identified as right-wing, with only 12% identifying as left-wing.

Shifting Sentiments and Political Trajectory

While some polling in July indicated a further decline in support for a two-state solution, the proportion of Israeli Jews identifying as right-wing has remained largely consistent, only slightly increasing from late 2022 figures. The shift towards the right in Israeli society began years before Oct. 7, driven by the stagnation of the peace process, recurrent conflicts with Hamas, and a nationalist government. Support for the two-state solution eroded gradually and then more rapidly by the end of the decade. This trend was reinforced as right-wing sentiments grew, leading to increased settlement expansion and discussions of annexation in the West Bank, processes accelerated by the current government.

Arab citizens of Israel have consistently remained the strongest supporters of peace, both before and after the recent conflicts. However, with dismal attitudes on both the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian sides in the years leading up to Oct. 7, a resurgence of violence appeared almost inevitable.

The Politics of Peace and Upcoming Elections

The number of Israeli Jews identifying as left-wing has seen little change, with approximately 20% of the total population, both Jewish and Arab, defining themselves as left-wing or centrist in a May survey by the Institute for National Security Studies. These groups generally support diplomacy and Palestinian self-determination. In a mid-2025 survey, a large majority of self-identified left-wing Israelis and nearly half of centrists supported a basic two-state solution.

Upcoming elections on October 27 are expected to reveal deep divisions among voters. Polls suggest that Prime Minister Netanyahu's current coalition is underperforming compared to the 2022 elections, with a majority of mainstream polls indicating support for opposition parties. However, this electoral trend is not new. In previous elections from 2019 to 2022, a majority of Israelis voted for right-wing parties, but coalition-building proved difficult due to opposition to Netanyahu's leadership.

Despite a potential majority for anti-Netanyahu parties, no poll predicts a clear majority for Israeli Jewish parties alone. Opposition leaders have indicated that parties representing Arab citizens should not be part of a coalition, a stance that implicitly links them to the Hamas attacks. Arab citizens of Israel, who have been strong supporters of peace and were also victims of the Oct. 7 attacks, show a strong desire for an Arab party to join the governing coalition. If Israeli party leaders prioritize their ideological opposition to including Arab parties over their opposition to Netanyahu, their options for forming a governing coalition may be limited.

Netanyahu faces challenges including ongoing corruption trials, criticism for the failures leading up to Oct. 7, protracted wars, and the extensive destruction in Gaza. However, he could still form the next government if the opposition fails to secure a majority. If he does, conditions such as Israeli annexation of Palestinian areas, continued occupation, and unending wars are likely to persist.