A nationwide blackout in the United States could last as long as 18 months if critical infrastructure is successfully targeted, according to Jon Wellinghoff, former chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Wellinghoff's concerns were amplified following a 2013 shooting incident at a Pacific Gas and Electric Company substation in San Jose, California. He conducted a power flow analysis modeling the impact of disabling the most critical substations in each of the three major U.S. power grids: the Eastern, Western, and Texas interconnections.
His analysis revealed that taking out just nine of the most critical substations across these three grids could cripple the entire nation's power supply. Wellinghoff noted that the specific substations do not matter, as long as they are among the top 10 most important in their respective regions. He stated that identifying these critical points is a task that could be accomplished relatively easily by individuals with internet access.
Following his discovery, Wellinghoff briefed the White House, Congress, and the Department of Energy, issuing a memo detailing the vulnerability and the potential for an 18-month-long outage. The Department of Homeland Security subsequently alerted utilities nationwide to the risks, urging them to enhance substation security. However, with over 55,000 substations across more than 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, securing every location is impractical.
In response, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) established a reliability standard requiring utilities to assess their substations and develop defense plans against physical attacks. The implementation details, however, were left to individual utilities.
Potential Consequences of a Prolonged Outage
A widespread and lengthy power outage would have severe repercussions. Initially, essential services like water treatment plants, sewage systems, and hospitals could maintain operations using on-site fuel reserves. Critical information could be disseminated through Primary Entry Point Stations equipped with 60 days of generator fuel.
However, the depletion of diesel and the shutdown of natural gas pumps would complicate restoration efforts, as many generating units rely on fossil fuels for their "black-start" capability. A 2010 report by NERC and the Energy Department indicated that food, water, and fuel supplies would degrade within days. Communication systems, including cellphones, internet, and television, would fail, and the economy would largely collapse due to the inability to process electronic transactions. Widespread social unrest and confusion would likely follow within days.
Challenges in Restoration and Replacement
Restoring power would necessitate significant international aid for essential supplies and the complex process of repairing or replacing damaged equipment. Replacing large power transformers, some weighing 800,000 pounds, presents substantial logistical hurdles. The process involves shipping specifications abroad, coordinating international deliveries, and transporting the massive units domestically. Specialized equipment, such as cranes and gantries, would be needed for installation and would likely be in short supply, as would the diesel fuel required to operate them.
Escalating Risks and Supply Chain Issues
The threat landscape has evolved since Wellinghoff's initial report. Neo-Nazi groups continue to study attacks on substations, and geopolitical tensions heighten concerns. China has been implicated in embedding backdoor software in a power transformer destined for a U.S. utility, and Iran has been linked to sabotage of water systems. Caitlin Durkovich, former secretary for infrastructure protection, expressed concern that such attacks on critical infrastructure are becoming normalized.
Compounding these threats are supply chain disruptions and increased demand for transformers. The average wait time for a large power transformer has surged from less than a year to 128 weeks, with some lead times reaching five years. Additionally, an estimated 75 percent of smaller distribution transformers are past their expected service life.
Domestic transformer manufacturing is hampered by tariffs on copper and aluminum, increasing costs. Manufacturers also face a shortage of skilled craftsmen, with some training programs starting with fundamental skills. Domestic production accounts for only about 20 percent of the transformers purchased in the U.S., with other countries, including China, supplying the remainder.
Efforts to Enhance Grid Resilience
In 2015, Congress explored the idea of a strategic transformer reserve, but it was shelved in favor of a voluntary utility-led equipment-sharing program. NERC's biennial GridEx exercises simulate responses to outages but are optional.
Government initiatives, such as invoking the Defense Production Act, aim to support domestic manufacturers of grid equipment. Companies like Ampersand are developing modular solid-state transformers designed for easier replacement, while others, like Delta Star, are expanding production to support AI development. Officials have also urged transformer manufacturers to engage with the Department of Energy to explore available financial tools.
Despite arguments from NERC's chief engineer, Mark Lauby, that the grid's complexity and redundancies make a massive blackout unlikely, Wellinghoff maintains that the vulnerabilities pose a significant and persistent threat to national security and stability.