Nations Warn of 'Dark Ages' Threat From Sabotaged Undersea Cables

A disturbing trend of sabotage targeting vital undersea communication cables and energy pipelines, primarily attributed to Russia and China, threatens to destabilize global infrastructure and potentially plunge modern society back to a pre-digital era, according to a new book.

In November 2024, a Chinese-flagged cargo ship, the Yi Peng 3, traversed the Baltic Sea, disabling two critical undersea cables connecting Sweden to Lithuania and Finland to Germany. European investigators found both cables had been physically severed, and the ship's proximity to both incidents pointed towards deliberate sabotage. China declined to cooperate with the subsequent investigation, and the vessel departed.

This incident is emblematic of a broader rise in what security experts term "hybrid attacks," occurring in a nebulous space between warfare and diplomacy. These attacks are designed to create plausible deniability for the nation-state actors involved. In the wake of the Yi Peng incident, similar disruptions have escalated globally, including mysterious fires at weapon plants across Europe and a Romanian air force interception of a robotic boat near a Black Sea gas platform. In September, the FBI indicted five individuals linked to Russian intelligence services for soliciting acts of arson and murder worldwide.

Elisabeth Braw's new book, "Undersea War: The Battle to Control the Cables and Pipelines That Connect Our World," sheds light on the critical, yet often overlooked, vulnerability of the vast network of underwater cables and pipelines that underpin modern life. This infrastructure, comprising an estimated 20,000 miles of subsea pipelines carrying oil and gas, and one million miles of communication cables, facilitates trillions of dollars in daily financial transactions and powers entire continents.

Braw argues that this "Undersea Kingdom" is accessible to malicious actors, who can exploit the difficulty in attributing such attacks. She notes that the existing legal framework for protecting this infrastructure dates back to the 1884 Paris Convention, which offers limited enforcement options against vessels registered in other nations.

The book details the actions of repeat offenders, such as the vessel NewNew Polar Bear, linked to attacks on cables and pipelines in Finnish waters, and the Yi Peng 3. Braw also touches upon the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline. A notable example of the impact of such attacks occurred in 2023, when Chinese cargo ships severed communication cables to Taiwan's Matsu islands, causing an immediate internet outage, disrupting hospital operations, and halting digital payments. Despite investigators identifying the responsible vessels, Taiwan's coast guard lacked the authority to detain them as they had left territorial waters.

Braw suggests redundancy—installing duplicate cables—as the most effective defense against sabotage. This strategy is reportedly being implemented in areas like the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan. The book also raises concerns that these "hybrid attacks" could escalate into broader conflicts, echoing a quote from Tom Clancy's "The Hunt For Red October": "This business will get out of control…and we’ll be lucky to live through it."

Recent events underscore these anxieties. In mid-September, NATO reportedly thwarted a Russian submarine exercise near Norway that appeared to be aimed at disabling undersea data cables. According to NATO officials, British submarines tracked three vessels from Russia's undersea warfare directorate during a covert operation in the Arctic, where they were testing a weapon designed to cut cables discreetly.

While the immediate impact of these incidents has not triggered a large-scale conflict, the underlying vulnerabilities persist. Braw contends that the "Undersea Kingdom" is indeed under siege, and the true consequences of these unseen battles may only become apparent when the power fails and the internet goes dark.