Leaked Russian Document Outlines Sweeping Cooperation Plan with Iran

A classified Russian government document from 2024-2026, obtained by Fox News Digital, details a comprehensive plan between Russia and Iran to expand their cooperation across financial, nuclear, aviation, energy, and transportation sectors. The 44-page document, marked "For official use," assigns responsibilities to various ministries and state companies and sets deadlines through the end of 2026, indicating a strategic effort to bolster ties as both nations face international sanctions.

The roadmap, approved by Russia on September 2, 2024, predates recent escalations in Middle East conflicts, but its provisions suggest a long-term strategy for mutual economic support and resilience against Western pressure. Analysts view the document's significance not in individual projects, but in the broader architecture of the relationship Moscow aimed to construct.

"The roadmap is not revelatory: people paying close attention to the relationship between Russia and Iran will see many collaborations between the two countries that have been public for years," said Keti Korkiya, a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Russia Program, who reviewed the document. "What is more revealing is the architecture of the relationship Moscow is trying to build," she added, pointing to financial mechanisms, transportation routes, energy investment, and aviation cooperation as key elements designed to reduce vulnerabilities created by sanctions.

A European intelligence source described the document as illustrating "comprehensive cooperation" and noted its focus on areas like nuclear programs, energy trade, and financial transactions, which aim to bypass U.S. sanctions. A U.S. official acknowledged that sanctions have isolated Russia and Iran but stated that Washington closely monitors and seeks to disrupt efforts by sanctioned countries to develop alternative financial channels.

The document itself avoids the term "sanctions evasion," instead advocating for increased use of national currencies, independent financial channels, and measures to counter "unilateral restrictive measures." Notably, in February 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that bilateral settlements had largely shifted to national currencies, utilizing independent financial messaging systems. Iran’s ambassador to Russia echoed this, asserting that SWIFT was no longer necessary for bilateral banking and that Iran's Shetab payment network was being linked with Russia's Mir system.

Korkiya explained that these initiatives, while not transformative individually, collectively aim to create redundancy and reduce single points of vulnerability in the economic relationship between Russia and Iran. The plan also includes a political component, calling for coordination through BRICS and other international forums to counter "unilateral trade restrictions" and to build an intellectual and diplomatic campaign against sanctions.

Nuclear and Energy Sectors

The cooperation extends to Iran's civilian nuclear program, with the roadmap assigning Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom continued involvement at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. This includes support for Unit 1 and ongoing construction for Units 2 and 3. By September 2, 2026, Rosatom confirmed that Russian specialists had returned to Bushehr, with Unit 1 preparing for maintenance and partial fuel replacement, and nuclear fuel already delivered.

The plan also identifies specific Iranian oil and gas fields, including Shadegan, Kish, and North Pars, where Moscow sought a role. Russia's Energy Ministry and unspecified Russian companies were assigned responsibility for advancing these projects. Evidence suggests at least one project, the Shadegan oil field, saw Russian state-owned ZN-Vostok begin development by February 2026, with Iranian officials expressing hope for expanded Russian investment.

Aviation and Transportation

A particularly unusual provision in the roadmap calls for Russia to assist in establishing the production of individual parts and assemblies for Russian aircraft within Iran. This initiative aimed to identify repairable or manufacturable parts, certify Iranian production sites, and finalize localization agreements by March 2026, with prototype production targeted by the end of 2026. While public evidence shows increased cooperation in aircraft maintenance, with Iranian companies approved for work on Russian aircraft, the direct manufacturing of Russian aircraft components in Iran has not been independently verified.

The document also outlines efforts to strengthen the physical transportation network connecting Russia and Iran. This includes work on a proposed railway from Iran’s border with Azerbaijan towards Persian Gulf ports. The Rasht-Astara railway, a key component of the International North-South Transport Corridor, saw engineering surveys launched in May 2025. Additionally, the roadmap details Iranian investment in port infrastructure in Astrakhan, Russia, including a terminal with warehouses and logistics facilities, which appears to be partially realized by an Iranian-owned company operating a terminal in Astrakhan.

Media, Technology, and Political Ties

Beyond industrial and financial cooperation, the roadmap includes provisions for media and technology exchanges. It calls for content exchange, journalist training, and joint media production, along with Russian technology companies securing contracts in Iran for information security, telecommunications, and the video-game industry.

Notably, the Russian side of the Permanent Russian-Iranian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation is chaired by Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, whose wife, Anna Tsivileva, is a deputy defense minister and the daughter of President Vladimir Putin’s late cousin. This connection underscores the political significance Moscow attaches to its relationship with Iran, according to analysts.

The level of state coordination and institutionalization involved, including the participation of central banks, ministries, and state companies, suggests a deliberate effort by Moscow to embed its partnership with Iran into a more durable framework, moving beyond mere political convenience.