A fatal air ambulance crash in New Mexico occurred after the crew lost GPS navigation capabilities during a U.S. military GPS jamming exercise, according to a preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The incident is prompting broader questions about aviation safety, the preparedness of civilian aircraft for electronic warfare, and the susceptibility of aging cockpit GPS technology to interference.
The Beech King Air air ambulance was en route to Ruidoso, New Mexico, on May 14 when the crew reported losing GPS signal shortly after departing from Roswell. Federal investigators are examining whether this loss of navigation contributed to the aircraft striking the Capitan Mountains, resulting in the deaths of both pilots and two flight nurses.
Prior to the flight, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued a notice warning airmen about a scheduled military GPS-denial exercise near White Sands Missile Range, indicating that disruptions could affect satellite navigation across a wide radius. Air traffic controllers twice requested that military officials suspend the jamming exercise to assist the flight. Three other aircraft in the vicinity also reported experiencing GPS outages.
After the military resumed its exercise, the aircraft descended for what was intended to be a visual approach to the airport. However, it ultimately impacted terrain in the Capitan Mountains. The NTSB has not yet determined if the GPS interference was a cause or contributing factor in the crash.
This event highlights growing concerns within the aviation industry about GPS interference. The FAA has advised pilots to be prepared for flight operations without GPS, citing intentional jamming as an "of greater and growing concern." The International Civil Aviation Organization has also warned that GPS interference can impact aircraft operations far beyond conflict zones and has noted a significant increase in reported GPS outages.
Experts, such as Todd Humphreys, director of the University of Texas' Radionavigation Laboratory, suggest that the navigation technology in many civilian aircraft may not have kept pace with evolving GPS jamming threats. Humphreys noted that some FAA-certified GPS receivers might be less resilient to interference than newer consumer-grade devices, pointing out that a pilot's smartphone could possess a superior GPS receiver.
While military electronic warfare systems are designed for large-scale denial of satellite navigation during training exercises, Humphreys expressed concern that aviation certification processes have been too slow to incorporate more resilient technology, leaving aircraft vulnerable to jamming and spoofing.
Paul Deres, vice president of operations at the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety Institute, emphasized the importance of pilot preparedness and proficiency, stating that technology can and does fail. He noted that the general aviation fleet utilizes a range of avionics to enhance situational awareness.
The FAA, while declining to comment on the specific ongoing investigation, stated that it provides notices of planned GPS disruptions and maintains backup navigation systems. The agency did not directly address claims that its certified GPS receivers have not kept pace with newer technologies.
GPS interference has been a recurring issue for commercial aviation in regions such as Europe and the Middle East, often linked to regional conflicts. In the U.S., such disruptions outside of military testing have been less common, though a 2025 incident near Washington, D.C., involved false collision alerts for airliners during counter-drone testing by the Secret Service and U.S. Navy.
Humphreys believes that while the U.S. has largely avoided the widespread disruption seen in Europe, regulatory bodies must modernize aviation technology to proactively address the increasing threat of GPS interference. He urged the FAA to accelerate its certification processes to better align with the rapidly changing technological landscape and safety environment.