Former Congressman Curt Weldon asserts that U.S. intelligence agencies identified lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and his associates a year before the terrorist attacks, but their warnings were blocked, preventing the tragedy. Weldon, a ten-term representative from Pennsylvania, claims a secret CIA program named Able Danger tracked Atta and his "Brooklyn cell" of terrorists.
According to Weldon, analysts within Able Danger feared Atta was preparing for a major catastrophe and attempted to warn agencies including the FBI and the Department of Justice. However, he alleges these efforts were systematically obstructed.
Weldon, who is releasing a book titled "Able Danger: What The 9/11 Commission Never Told You," contends that the Able Danger findings were absent from the 9/11 Commission Report released in 2004. He expressed a desire for the truth about the attacks to emerge, stating, "America's got to realize that 9/11 is not what we're led to believe... I want the story to come out."
The former congressman claims that within U.S. intelligence, a small number of officials knew instantly who was behind the attacks because they were already tracking several of the hijackers. He describes Able Danger as an "innovative, multiservice, multiagency intelligence program" that used supercomputers to analyze vast amounts of unclassified internet data.
Weldon alleges that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta and his cell over a year before the attacks, and team members attempted to share this intelligence with the FBI at least three times by late 2000. He claims they were blocked by bureaucracy and military lawyers.
Previous official statements have downplayed these allegations. In the past, the Pentagon stated it was unable to verify Weldon's claims, with a Defense Department spokesman noting the project found "mostly general references to terrorist cells" without directly naming Atta. In 2006, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that agents who claimed to see Atta on pre-9/11 intelligence charts were mistaken.
Weldon, who served as vice-chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and Homeland Security Committee after 9/11, maintains his belief in Able Danger's findings, stating that intelligence analysts warned him about the program's findings after the attacks, but those involved were "harassed, shut down and lied about."
Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence in 2006, testified to the House Armed Services Committee that there were no verified formal requests for Able Danger information before 9/11, and no evidence showed intelligence sharing had been prohibited. Weldon, however, argues that program members told him they did attempt to share information but faced a "wall" of secrecy.
He attributes the alleged suppression of information partly to a 1995 memo from the Clinton administration's Justice Department, known as the 'Firewall Memo.' Weldon claims this memo, intended to govern information sharing related to criminal investigations, created a bureaucratic barrier that prevented the CIA from freely sharing intelligence with domestic agencies like the FBI.
Weldon alleges that on at least three occasions, Able Danger team members tried to share information with the DOJ about Atta and his cell's plotting in New York, but scheduled meetings were canceled each time. "Thus, the Able Danger team was prevented from fingering Mohamed Atta to the FBI, sacrificing the best chance to stop the September 11 catastrophe... on the altar of political correctness," Weldon stated.
Despite past dismissals of his claims, Weldon's upcoming book has received endorsements from figures like Jim Gilmore, former Governor of Virginia, and Erik Kleinsman, former Chief of Intelligence in the U.S. Army's Land Information Warfare Activity. Weldon has also called for a new presidential commission on 9/11 to thoroughly investigate these allegations, a sentiment echoed by some members of Congress.
The focus on potential Islamic terrorism within the U.S. intensified after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, where a truck bomb detonated in the parking garage of the North Tower, killing six people. In 1996, Weldon became chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, overseeing significant defense spending and funding intelligence technology databases that evolved into the Able Danger task force.
Weldon expressed ongoing frustration that his efforts to reveal what Able Danger allegedly knew have been ignored, accusing intelligence circles of manipulating public perception to discredit questioning voices. He remains haunted by the possibility that the tragedy could have been averted.